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Asymmetric information and heterogeneous effects of R&D subsidies: 
Evidence on R&D investment and employment of scientists and technicians 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Business investment in research and development (R&D) may remain below optimum due to 
knowledge externalities (Arrow, 1962; 1996; Romer, 1990) and/or capital market failures in 
pricing risky R&D projects correctly (Bloom et al., 2007; Czarnitzki and Toole, 2007; Minton 
and Schrand, 1999). However, there are also arguments that the gap between the socially-
optimal and actual levels of R&D investment may be small for several reasons. First, firms 
need to invest in R&D and build “absorptive capacity” in the first place to benefit from 
knowledge externalities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Hottenrott and Peters, 2012; Griffith et 
al., 2004). Second, the extent of knowledge spillovers can be limited by patent protection and 
commercial secrecy (Nadiri, 1993). Finally, public subsidies may even lead to excess R&D 
investment if competition unfolds as ‘patent races’ (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Dasgupta, 
1988; Fudenberg et al., 1983).  
 
These competing theoretical perspectives suggest that the gap between the firms’ actual and 
optimal levels of R&D investment before the subsidy is likely to be heterogeneous. To the 
extent this is the case, the effect of an optimal subsidy from the funder’s point of view is likely 
to generate heterogeneous R&D efforts. Indeed, this is evident in a recent meta-analysis of the 
empirical literature, which reports that the effects vary considerably between primary studies 
and more than 40% of the reported estimates indicate either crowding-out effects or no effect 
(Dimos and Pugh, 2016).  
 
A handful of studies have reported within-study heterogeneity too. For example, Guellec and 
Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003), and Gorg and Strobl (2007) report a hump-shaped 
relationship between the effect size and the the ratio of subsidy to R&D investment (subsidy 
intensity), with higher probability of crowding-out effects at the low and high ends of the 
support intensity distribution. Czarnitzki and Toole (2007) report that the additionality effect 
is smaller as product-market uncertainty increases. There is also evidence that the additonality 
effect is larger among firms receiving support from multiple sources (Czarnitzki and Lopes-
Bento, 2013).  Hud and Hussinger (2015), on the other hand, find that the subsidy is associated 
with a crowding-out effect during the financial crisis year of 2009, in contrast to additionality 
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effects in other years. Finally, Marino et al. (2016) find that R&D tax credits may amplify the 
crowding-out effects of the subsidies.  
 
The empirical literature, however, has offered little theoretical explanation for effect-size 
heterogeneity. Explanations tend to be ex post and even then the relationship between the 
heterogeneous findings and information asymmetry in a principal-agent setting is often 
overlooked.  We aim to bridge this gap by drawing on the theory of contracts; and demonstrate 
that the treatment effect heterogeneity is related to levels of informational rents that different 
firm types can extract when the subsidy contract is characterised by asymmetric information, 
risk aversion and non-verifiability of the state of nature.   
 
The theory of contracts is well-documented (Laffont and Mortimort, 2009; Hart and Moore, 
1990; Hart, 2017) and has been applied widely in research on regulation and organisation 
(Mookherjee, 2006). A recent study by Akcigit et al. (2017) extends the application of 
mechanism design in the context of public support for business R&D. Drawing on this work, 
we demonstrate that the subsidy-induced incentives differ between firm types and propose four 
hypotheses on how a subsidy that satisfies the incentive constraints of the participating firms 
generate different treatment effects.  
 
First, we hypothesize that subsidies would be associated with crowding-out (substitution) 
effects after the onset of financial crises. This is due to tighter liquidity/credit constraints and 
lower expected profits from R&D, which induce the risk-averse firms to reduce effort or require 
insurance against risk at each level of the subsidy set by the funder. Secondly, we hypothesize 
that subsidies are more likely to be associated with additionality (complementarity) effects 
among younger firms and start-ups, but with crowding-out effects among older firms. Our third 
hypothesis concerns firm size and can be stated as follows: subsidies are more likely to be 
associated with additionality effects among smaller firms, but with crowding-out effects among 
larger firms. Finally, we hypothesize that the relationship between R&D intensity and the 
treatment effect has an inverted-U shape. In the latter three hypotheses, type-dependent effect-
size heterogeneity is due to different levels of informational rents that firms can extract, 
depending on their efficiency with which they can convert the R&D input into quality 
innovations/products. 
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We test these hypotheses using propensity score matching (PSM) and double robust (DR) 
estimators applied to an unbalanced panel dataset of 43,650 R&D-active UK firms from 1998-
2012. We provide a range of estimation results based on: (i) pooled data for the full period; (ii) 
two sub-periods (1998-2007 and 2008-2012); (iii) pooled data for different firm-types in terms 
of age, size and R&D intensity; and (iv) cross-section data for each year in the analysed period. 
One of our findings is that UK public subsidies have been associated with crowding-out effects 
in the aftermath of the dot.com bubble (2003-2004) and after the global financial crisis (2009-
2012) 1. Secondly, subsidies are associated with crowding-out effects among larger and older 
firms. In contrast, subsidies are associated with additionality effects when the firm is a start-
up, young or small. Overall, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) in the whole 
period or in any particular year decays monotonously when regressed on age or size deciles. 
Finally, we find that the ATT follows an inverted-U pattern when evaluated against the firm’s 
privately-funded or total R&D intensity. These findings are consistent across two estimators 
and hold for two innovation inputs: privately-funded R&D intensity and the ratio of R&D 
personnel to total employment.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we review the relevant literature to 
demonstrate why an ex ante theoretical framework is required to explain heterogeneity in the 
subsidy’s effects on business R&D investment. Section 3 discusses the funding regime in the 
UK, spells out the information asymmetries it entails, and draws on contract theory to distil 
testable hypotheses about the sources of heterogeneity in the treatment effect. In section 4, we 
present our dataset and empirical strategy. Here we first provide evidence on the treated and 
untreated samples, the coverage rate (the percentage of firms in receipt of government subsidy), 
the support intensity (the ratio of subsidy to privately-funded R&D expenditures), and the 
distribution of the public subsidy by firm age and size. Then we discuss the PSM and DR 
estimators and how we address the issues that arise in the context of pooled panel data. The 
empirical results are presented in section 5, followed with additional sensitivity and matching 
quality checks in the Appendix. Finally, in the conclusions, we distil the main findings and 
discuss their implications for future research and public policy.  
  
                                                          
1 The start of the dot.com and global financial crises are 2001 and 2007, respectively. However, the trough for 
both are 2002 and 2009 respectively.    
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2.   Relevant literature  
Following the pioneering work by Blank and Stigler (1957), a growing number of researchers 
have utilised a variety of datasets and different estimation methods to establish whether public 
support for business R&D has complementary or substitution effects. David et al. (2000) 
review the evidence mainly from structural models without control for selection into treatment. 
Of 14 firm-level studies reviewed, three reported additionality, five studies based on US data 
reported crowding-out effects, and the remaining six reported mixed findings. The findings are 
similar in later reviews, of which Garcia-Quevedo (2004) reviews 28 studies that utilize firm-
level data and reports that seven studies find additionality, ten studies find no significant 
effects, and eleven report crowding-out effects. A recent meta-analysis of the evidence from 
52 primary studies published from 2000-2013 demonstrates that the meta-average of the partial 
correlation coefficient is small in two-thirds of the estimations and moderate in the rest. Also, 
about 40% of the findings indicate crowding-out or insignificant effects; whereas the remaining 
60% indicate additionality effects (Dimos and Pugh, 2016).  
 
Another empirical pattern is that studies based on continental European data and more recent 
studies that utilise matching methods tend to report additionality effects more often than 
previous studies. For example, Hall and Maffioli (2008) report additionality effects from 
development funds sponsored by the World Bank in Latin America. Similarly, Czatrnitzki and 
Lopes-Bento (2013) report additionality effects in Flanders, using the fourth Community 
Innovation Survey data and matching difference-in-difference (D-i-D) estimator. Other studies 
reporting similar effects include Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) and Hussinger (2008) for 
German firms; Duguet (2004) for French firms; and Aerts and Schmidt (2008) for firms in 
Germany and Flanders.  
 
However, the estimates are heterogeneous even among recent studies and those based on 
European data. For example, Czarnitzki and Toole (2007) report smaller additionality effects 
as product-market uncertainty increases. Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) acknowledge that 
it is necessary to verify if the treatment effect is time-varying, particularly during crisis years. 
This is done in Hud and Hussinger (2015), who report that subsidies are associated with a 
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crowding-out effect during the crisis year of 2009.2 Takalo et al., (2013) report that the 
treatment effect is positive on average but the latter conceals a high degree of heterogeneity 
among Finnish firms. Finally, Marino et al. (2016) investigate the effect of subsidies on private 
R&D expenditure in a sample of French firms from 1993–2009 and report that crowding-out 
effects are stronger under the R&D tax-credit regime and among recipients of large and 
medium-sized subsidy doses compared to recipients of lower doses or non-subsidised firms.  
 
Although we observe increased attention to effect-size heterogeneity, the explanation for the 
latter is usually ex post or has nothing to say about whether it may be reflecting different levels 
of informational rents that firms may extract under the subsidy contract. To our knowledge, 
only two studies have so far offered ex ante theoretical explanations for the heterogeneous firm 
responses to public subsidy.  
 
Wanzenböck et al., (2013) focus on three types of behavioural additionality (project, scale and 
cooperation additionality) and identify three firm characteristics as potential determinants: 
R&D intensity/experience, technological specialization, and collaboration propensity. Their 
findings indicate that R&D-intensive firms are less likely to exhibit behavioural additionality 
because such firms have the capacity and the experience to identify and realise the desired 
R&D projects irrespective of public support.   
 
On the other hand, Lee (2011) focuses on input additionality and utilizes a model that identifies 
four potential channels through which public support can influence business R&D investment: 
(i) the technological-competence-enhancing effect; (ii) the demand-creating effect; (iii) the 
R&D-cost-reducing effect; and (iv) the project overlap (or duplication) effect. Their findings 
indicate that public support is associated with crowding-out effects among large firms, but with 
additionality effects among small and financially-constrained firms. The crowding-out effect 
among large firms are explained by their proximity to the technological frontier, which leaves 
little need for catching up. In contrast, additionality effects among small firms are explained 
by these firms’ distance to the frontier and their eagerness to catch up.  
 
                                                          
2 Effect-size heterogeneity is also observed in studies that investigate the effect of tax rebates on private R&D 
investment. For example, Baghana and Mohnen (2009) estimate the price elasticity of R&D investment with 
respect to tax credits among Canadian firms and report that: (i) while short-run additionality effects are observed 
among small firms, the effect is insignificant among large firms; and (ii) the long-run additionality effect decays 
over time, but the decay is more pronounced among large firms.   
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These studies represent welcome steps in the right direction, but they overlook the agency costs 
that may arise under the subsidy regime, the extent of information asymmetries between the 
principal (the funder) and the agent (the subsidized firm), and the ways in which information 
asymmetries may induce different firm types to respond to subsidies differently. To address 
these issues, we draw on insights from the contract theory and its implications for public policy 
design (Laffont and Tirole, 1986; Baron and Myerson, 1982; Sappington, 1982; Bolton and 
Dewatripont, 2005).  In the next section, we summarise the subsidy regime in the UK and 
demonstrate why the agency problems inherent in the regime can be analysed effectively by 
drawing on insights from the contract theory. In the second part, we develop four testable 
hypotheses informed by contract theory.  
 
3. The funding regime and agency costs: Testable hypotheses 
 
Direct support for business R&D is provided by the UK government departments and their 
agencies; and non-departmental public bodies such as the Technology Strategy Board and its 
successor, Innovate UK.3 Despite this fragmented outlook, two main features of the regime 
stand out. First, the largest part of the direct funding has been managed by non-departmental 
agencies, of which Innovate UK is the current incumbent. The latter provides funding for 
business-led projects with the objective of stimulating R&D and innovation activity.  
 
Secondly, UK support for business R&D has to comply with the State-Aid rules of the 
European Union (EU), under which R&D grants should not lead to unfair competition in the 
product market. The risk of unfair product-market competition is measured by the proximity 
of the applicant’s project to its market operations – the so-called market readiness level (MRL). 
R&D activities that score 1 or 2 on the RML scale are furthest away from the market. They 
consist of basic research and qualify for public funding of up to 100% (see Table 1). Activities 
with an MRL score of 3 to 6 are considered as conducive to product and process innovations 
that may not be undertaken optimally due to spill-over effects or market imperfections. Part-
funding for such activities account for the largest part of the UK (and EU) R&D subsidies.  
  
                                                          
3 The non-departmental public agencies also include eight regional development agencies (RDAs), which 
also provided R&D funding from 2000 to 2012, but then discontinued.  
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Table 1: Funding rates as percentage of eligible project costs – Innovate UK: 2014 
Project type→ 
Firm size↓ 
Fundamental 
research 
Feasibility 
studies 
Industrial 
research 
Experimental 
development 
Micro (<10 employees) or 
Small (<50 employees) 100% 70% 60% 35% 
Medium (<250 employees) 100% 60% 60% 35% 
Large (250+ employees) 100% 50% 50% 25% 
Source: Innovate UK. 
 
To secure public funding, the applicant must satisfy a number of selection criteria, including: 
(i) whether the project could be undertaken without public funding; (ii) how the project 
represents value for money for the taxpayer; and (iii) how the applicant will benefit from the 
innovation, including the latter’s impact on productivity and growth. The additionality 
requirement is made explicit on the application form, which requires the applicant to explain 
why public support is sought and why private finance may not be available for the project.4  
 
If a subsidy is granted, the Innovate UK monitors funded projects against detailed project plans 
and financial forecasts.  Payments to successful applicants are made for project-related costs 
incurred and paid between the project start and end dates, and in quarterly arrears. This set up 
implies that the firm’s planned R&D investment is observable and hence no information 
asymmetries are involved with respect to this indicator. However, information asymmetry does 
exist with respect to two unobservable factors: the firm’s research effort (the diligence with 
which the firm converts the R&D inputs into quality innovations); and its research productivity 
(the efficiency with which the firm converts the unobservable effort and the observable R&D 
expenditures into innovative products). In addition, the Innovation UK, like many other public 
R&D funders, does not monitor the firm’s output or its price-cost margin.  
 
This funding regime constitutes a typical principal-agent setting, where the principal (funder) 
concludes a contract with the agent (firm) with a view to induce the latter to undertake R&D 
investment that would not have been possible without public support. The behavioural 
assumptions in this setting are: (i) the principal and the agent are rational and both try to 
maximize their utilities; (ii) the agent has private information about its type in terms of effort 
                                                          
4 See Innovate UK, Short Guidebook for Innovate UK Competition Applicants at 
https://sbri.innovateuk.org/documents/17078356/21883504/Innovate%20UK%20Guidebook_FINALDIGITALV
ERSION.pdf?version=1.0 
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and efficiency; (iii) the principal does not know the agent's type, but the probability distribution 
of the agent types is common knowledge; and (iv) the principal moves first by offering a 
contract under asymmetric information about the agent’s type, while the agent accepts or 
declines the contract.  
 
Under perfect information where firm-types in terms of research effort and research 
productivity are fully observable, the funder will be able to set the optimal subsidy that 
maximise social welfare. In turn, the firm would respond to the subsidy by increasing its 
privately-funded R&D investment because the latter’s marginal cost is lower after the subsidy. 
This first-best outcome does not preclude effect-size heterogeneity due to different levels of 
knowledge spillovers faced by heterogeneous firms. However, and to the extent that knowledge 
spillovers exist, effect-size heterogeneity would be revealed as a variation in the magnitude of 
the additionality effects rather than as a mixture of additionality and crowding-out effects as 
reported in the literature.  
 
Under asymmetric information, the first-best outcomes are not feasible as both the subsidy and 
R&D investment allocations must satisfy the incentive constraints of the firms that differ in 
terms of unobservable research effort and research productivity. Departures from the first-best 
outcomes reflect informational rents (or agency costs) that arise when firms conceal their true 
types in terms of effort, efficiency and risk-aversion, which are known to the firm but only their 
distribution is common knowledge (Akcigit et al., 2017: 16; Laffont and Mortimort, 2009: 50; 
Salanie, 2005).   
 
In what follows, we define four key concepts that underpin our hypotheses on sources of 
heterogeneity in the subsidy’s effect on business R&D investment. The first is incompleteness 
of the R&D subsidy contract. The subsidy contract is incomplete in that it neither defines all 
possible states of nature that may affect the parties’ performance, nor does it provide for an 
adjudicator that would settle disputes between the parties. Incomplete contracting is due to high 
cost of writing ex ante contracts contingent on every state of nature (Laffont and Mortimort, 
2009: 231). Furthermore, verifying the contractual performance is quite difficult when the 
agent “makes representations that the true state of the world is different than both parties know 
it to be.” (Williamson, 1975: 32). In Laffont and Mortimort (2009), such sources of contention 
are conducive to second-best agent performance if the agent is risk averse.  
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The second concept is firm efficiency in converting the observable R&D expenditures and the 
unobservable research effort into quality products. As demonstrated in recent studies (Bloom 
et al., 2007; Bloom et al., 2013), variation in firm efficiency may reflect heterogeneity in 
management practices; or it can be a function of firm characteristics such as age, size, R&D 
intensity that affect firm efficiency in converting the R&D input into quality 
innovations/products (Akcigit et al., 2017). Under information asymmetry, more efficient firms 
can extract information rents by concealing their ‘true type’ and mimicking low-efficiency 
firms. Both the theory of contracts (Laffont and Martimort, 2009) and its application to 
mechanism design in the context of public support for R&D investment (Akcigit et al., 2017) 
demonstrate that the incentive-compatible subsidy and the firms’ R&D investment are second-
best under asymmetric information about the firm’s research efficiency (productivity). Also, 
the second-best outcomes entail informational rents that the efficient firm-types are able to 
extract by mimicking inefficient firms. Akcigit et al., (2017) further demonstrate that: (i) the 
incentives to conceal one’s type are higher if the firm is more risk-averse and more efficient; 
and (ii) the informational rents are higher when the funder does not monitor the firm’s output.  
 
The third is R&D investment wedge, which measures the deviation of the optimum level of 
R&D investment after subsidy from the level of R&D investment that the firm would choose 
with patent protection only. This wedge provides an indicator about the level at which the 
optimal subsidy should be set, taking account of two corrections that address market failures 
and one modification due to information asymmetry: (i) a Pigouvian correction for spillovers 
from the firm’s own innovation; (ii) a “monopoly quality valuation correction” that would 
induce the firm to equalise its marginal private benefits of the product quality improvement 
with marginal social benefits; and (iii) a modification to the first-best incentive, designed to 
satisfy the incentive constraint of the efficient firm. The larger the R&D investment wedge is 
the higher are the incentives for R&D investment (Akcigit et al. 2017).  
 
The fourth concept is the relative complementarities of the observed R&D investment to the 
firm’s unobserved research effort and research productivity. In Akcigit et al. (2017), the firm 
can extract a higher level of informational rents if the complementarity of its R&D investment 
to research productivity is higher than the complementarity to research effort.  
 
Our first hypothesis (H1) relates to the effect of financial crises on the behaviour of subsidized 
firms. We assume that the probability distribution of the crisis and non-crisis periods in the 
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economy is common knowledge, but neither the funder nor the subsidy-recipient is certain 
about which state will be observed when the contract is implemented. Also, the parties do not 
contract on how the financial crisis might affect firm performance. This is apparent from the 
absence of a third party (a court of justice) that would resolve conflicts and enforce the contract 
when disputes arise about how the change in the state of nature affects the parties’ payoffs. In 
this setting, the effect of a crisis on the subsidized firm’s response to the subsidy depends on 
two key parameters: the degree of the firm’s risk-aversion and the extent to which the firm’s 
observed R&D investment becomes a noisy indicator of performance.  
 
In both Laffont and Martimort (2009) and Akcigit et al. (2017), risk-aversion and noise in the 
firm’s observed performance indicator (which is R&D investment in our case) are associated 
with more inefficient allocations of the subsidy and R&D investment. On the one hand, the 
onset of a financial crisis increases the risks faced by risk-averse firms and induces the latter 
to reduce effort at each level of subsidy offered. Reduced effort, in turn, will lead to lower 
R&D investment as the subsidy on offer does not provide sufficient insurance against increased 
risks. On the other hand, the funder will be less able to hold the firm to account on the basis of 
observed R&D investment, as the latter becomes a “noisy” indicator of the unobserved research 
effort. The “noise” is due to increased variance of the privately-funded R&D investment, which 
is a function of the cost and availability of the external finance after the crisis.  
 
Laffont and Mortimort (2009: 253, 271) demonstrate that ex ante non-verifiability does not 
entail agency costs if an adjudicator exists and the latter “…can credibly impose punishments” 
on the party that violates the contract. In the absence of such a ‘court of justice’, however, the 
combination of risk aversion and reduced quality of the observed R&D investment as an 
indicator of effort causes departures from the first-best allocations. Given this theoretical 
conclusion, we state our first hypothesis (H1) as follows: 
 
H1: R&D subsidies will be associated with crowding-out or smaller additionality 
effects after the onset of a financial crisis due to increased risk aversion and 
contestability of the R&D performance as an indicator of true firm effort.  
 
An increase in perceived risks during economic downturns can be inferred from the analysis in 
Akcigit et al., (2017), whose model depends on interest rate, program horizon, R&D costs, 
mean sales growth, and median R&D expenditures to sales. As firms’ survival time and growth 
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of sales are smaller after the onset of a financial crisis, the model predicts weaker firm 
responses to subsidies. Findings in other studies also point out in the same direction. In 
Acemoglu and Linn (2005) and Dubois et al. (2015), pharmaceutical firms reduce R&D 
investment during downturns as the latter reduce the market size, which is a major determinant 
for innovation incentives. Furthermore, Bloom (2007) demonstrates that the firm’s R&D effort 
during periods of uncertainty becomes less responsive to public subsidies and sales. Finally, 
the average R&D investment is lower as sales volatility increases, and this negative association 
is stronger among credit-constrained firms (Aghion et al., 2012).  
 
Our second and third hypotheses relate to why the treatment effect may depend on firm type in 
terms of age and size, respectively. Akcigit et al. (2017) demonstrate that, under asymmetric 
information, the firm’s R&D investment wedge is determined by exogeneous characteristics 
that determine the firm type.  Specifically, the authors find that the R&D investment wedge: 
(i) declines monotonically with firm age; (ii) follows a hump-shape pattern as the firm type 
becomes increasingly efficient; and (iii) is smaller if the funder does not control the firm’s 
output (i.e., if the funder takes the intellectual property protection regime as given).  
 
Akcigit et al., (2017: 29-30) point out that the time horizon for the R&D (or any) investment 
is shorter as the firm gets older and the firm’s duration is finite with a known expected value. 
An increase in firm age, therefore, is associated with a lower level of R&D investment under 
laissez-faire or with subsidy. This is because R&D investment contributes to firm’s value for 
a smaller number of periods as the firm gets older and the time horizon for its investment gets 
shorter.  
 
However, there may be a direct age effect in that the firm’s efficiency in converting R&D 
inputs into quality products may also change with age. A large body of work on firm dynamics 
report that age is positively correlated with firm survival; and that younger firms have a higher 
probability of exiting, but those that survive tend to grow faster than average (Geroski, 1995; 
Ugur et al., 2016a). This is usually explained by learning with age: older firms are more 
efficient in converting the R&D investment into quality products compared to younger firms, 
but may also be less adaptive to disruption due to organizational inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 
1989). Given this association between age and R&D efficiency, older (hence more efficient) 
firms have incentives to conceal their true types and extract informational rents. Therefore, we 
state our second testable hypothesis (H2) as follows:  
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H2: R&D subsidies will be associated with crowding-out or smaller additionality 
effects when the firms are older, but an additionality effect is more likely when the 
firm is younger or a start-up. 
 
In studies of industry evolution and growth, firm age and size are positively correlated 
(Haltiwanger et al., 2013; Akcigit and Kerr, 2010; and Aghion et al., 2014; 2015). In our data, 
the correlation between the logarithms of firm age and size is 0.51 and highly significant. Given 
this correlation, it is empirically plausible that the incentives of the firm to invest in R&D with 
or without subsidy may be falling in firm size, just as it does fall with firm age under Hypothesis 
2. This is because older firms are likely to be larger too. 
 
Although this empirical explanation is plausible, we argue that there is also a theoretical reason 
as to why firm responses to subsidies would be size-dependent too. For example, Audretsch 
and Mahmood (1995), Dunne et al. (1988) and Mata and Portugal (1994) report that the 
positive correlations between firm size and survival is due to the accumulation of basic 
competitive assets and skills, both of which increase with firm size. In the Schumpeterian work, 
firm size is measured by the number of product lines that reflect the rate of success in the firm’s 
innovation history. A firm must have succeeded in introducing new product lines before it 
survives and becomes large and tend to grow faster than average (Aghion et al., 2014; 2015).  
 
Given these insights, we argue that a larger firm size (in terms of employment or turnover) is 
an indicator of more efficient firm type.  From the perspective of contract theory, the R&D 
investment wedge among larger (hence more R&D-efficient) firms is smaller with or without 
subsidy. Therefore, the treatment effect of public subsidy on larger firms can be expected to be 
smaller than that of smaller firms. Hence, we state our third hypothesis (H3) as follows:  
 
H3: R&D subsidies will be associated with crowding-out or smaller additionality 
effects when the firms are larger; but an additionality effect is more likely when the 
firms are smaller. 
 
H2 and H3 also in line with other insights from the incomplete contracts literature, which 
focuses on the hold-up problem (Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 2017). Under incomplete 
contracting, the hold-up problem is conducive to underinvestment irrespective of whether the 
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principal or the agent is the residual claimant for total (private and social) returns to investment. 
If the funder were the residual claimant, under-investment would occur because the agent 
would get only part of the ex post gains from trade. If the firm were the residual claimant, 
under-investment would occur because of the risks that the firm would face. The evidence in 
Table 3 below indicates that a relatively smaller number of large and old firms account for 
disproportionately higher proportions of the subsidies and R&D investment. This fact 
motivates the larger and older firms to mimic smaller and younger firms that typically are more 
risk-averse.  
 
Our fourth hypothesis concerns the relationship between the treatment effect and the firm’s 
R&D intensity. To flesh out this hypothesis, we draw on a key parameter in Akcigit et al. 
(2017): the complementarity of R&D investment to research effort compared to research 
productivity. When the complementarity of the R&D investment to research productivity is 
relatively larger than the complementarity with research effort, the firm would be closer to the 
optimal level of R&D investment without subsidy. Therefore it would require a larger subsidy 
to increase R&D investment from a level that is close to the optimum (Akcigit et al., 2017). 
Therefore, the optimal subsidy from the funder’s perspective would be associated with smaller 
treatment effects when the increase in the firm’s R&D intensity contributes more to the firm’s 
research productivity than to its research effort.  
 
In contrast, an increase in the firm’s R&D intensity will be associated with larger treatment 
effects if the firm’s R&D investment is more complementary to its research effort. This is 
because, the increase in R&D intensity will induce the firm to exercise higher research effort. 
This is clearly preferable for the funder, who would match the increased effort with a larger 
subsidy (Akcigit et al., 2017: 4, 16). Therefore, for a given subsidy, the treatment effect will 
be larger when the firm’s R&D intensity increases and the increase in the latter is more 
complementary to the firm’s research effort.  
 
The question is whether we can establish the levels of R&D intensity at which R&D investment 
is more complementary to research productivity compared to research effort (or vice versa). 
Akcigit et al. (2017) provide part of the answer: the complementarity of the R&D investment 
to research productivity dominates the complementarity to the research effort when the firm is 
efficient – i.e., when it is more productive in converting the R&D input into quality products. 
The other part can be deduced from Schumpeterian models of innovation and growth, which 
17 
 
demonstrate that R&D investment is a stronger determinant of productivity as the firm is nearer 
to the technology frontier – i.e., when its R&D intensity is high (Aghion et al., 2014; 2015).  
 
Therefore, we conclude that the complementarity of the R&D investment to research 
productivity would dominate the complementarity to research effort at relatively high levels of 
R&D intensity. In contrast, the complementarity of the R&D investment to research effort 
would dominate at relatively low levels of R&D intensity. Given this conclusion, we can state 
our fourth hypothesis (H4) as follows:  
 
H4: The treatment effect will follow an inverted-U pattern when evaluated against 
R&D intensity: the effect increases as R&D intensity rises from a low level, but 
gradually declines and may become negative as R&D intensity increases beyond a 
certain threshold.  
 
In the following sections, we test these hypotheses using two treatment effect estimators (PSM 
and DR) on a random panel sample of 43,650 R&D-active UK firms from 1998 to 2012. We 
evaluate the effect of subsidy on two innovation inputs: the ratio of privately-funded R&D 
expenditures to turnover and the share of R&D personnel (scientists and technicians) in total 
employment.  
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4.   Data and methodology 
  
Data 
Our dataset is from the Business Research and Development Database (BERD) – a repeated 
annual survey designed to measure R&D expenditures by UK businesses.5 The BERD survey 
is based on a sample of R&D-active firms, stratified by product group and employment size-
bands. The R&D-active status is established on the basis of information from the R&D Tax 
Credit claims, community innovation surveys (CIS), responses to a survey question about R&D 
activity in the Annual Business Survey (ABS), and other sources of administrative data.  The 
stratified sample consists of large (size-band1) firms with 400+ employees (sampled 1:1); size-
band2-firms (100-399 employees) sampled 1:5 and size-band3-firms (0-99 employees) 
sampled at a rate of 1:20. In 2012, 400 large R&D-spenders that are included in the survey 
every year account for 78% of UK business R&D expenditures (ONS, 2012: 14).  
The survey questionnaire asks firms to report the number of scientists and technicians (R&D 
personnel) employed and the R&D expenditures incurred, broken down by location (intramural 
or extramural), type (basic, applied, experimental, etc.) and source of funding (public or 
private). The value of public funding from the UK and EU sources are reported separately.6 All 
entries for total, privately-funded and publicly-funded R&D correspond to amounts actually 
incurred and/or received during the year.  This arrangement ties in closely with how Innovate 
UK monitors the subsidized firm’s R&D expenditures and pay the subsidy quarterly on the 
basis of incurred expenditures. Therefore, the dataset we have is quite suitable for estimating 
treatment effects of the subsidy received in a year on the privately-funded R&D expenditures 
and employment of R&D personnel in that year - even though the firm may have multiple 
funded projects or each project may be multi-annual. 
The characteristics of our sample with respect to privately-funded R&D expenditures, public 
funding, subsidy intensity and coverage rates are presented in Table 2. Column 1 indicates that 
privately-funded R&D expenditures are lower than preceding year in 2003 but remains stable 
from 2008-2010 and records a small increase in 2011 and 2012. On the other hand, private 
R&D intensity is lower than the preceding year in 2002; and does not recover to the level of 
                                                          
5  Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2017.  See also Anonymous, 2016b. 
6 The privately-funded R&D investment we use in this paper is the difference between total R&D expenditures 
and the sum of UK and EU subsidies. AS such, privately-funded R&D consists of non-publicly-funded intramural 
R&D and extramural R&D. The latter is explicitly defined in the survey questionnaire as privately-funded R&D 
purchased from or commissioned outside the firm. 
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2008 in the remaining years from 2009-2012 (column 2). This evidence indicates that firms 
have tended to reduce their R&D expenditures relative to turnover in response to the bursting 
of the dot.com bubble in 2002 and during the aftermath of the global financial crisis, 
particularly from 2009 onwards. 
 
 
Table 2: R&D expenditures and UK subsidies: By year 
(43,650 firms with 201,058 firm/year observations from 1998-2012) 
 1.Private 
R&D 
2. Private 
R&D int.  3.Subsidy 
4. Subsidy 
intensity 5. Coverage 
Year (£ bn.)  (Private R&D / turnover) (£ bn.) 
(Subsidy / Priv. 
R&D) 
(Subsidised firms / 
total firms) 
1998 9.04 0.027 0.91 0.10 0.86 
1999 9.53 0.029 0.94 0.10 0.86 
2000 9.70 0.028 0.83 0.09 0.77 
2001 10.10 0.029 0.69 0.07 0.94 
2002 10.50 0.025 0.46 0.04 0.94 
2003 7.85 0.034 0.93 0.12 0.97 
2004 10.50 0.029 1.17 0.11 0.95 
2005 13.00 0.029 1.06 0.08 0.90 
2006 14.20 0.024 0.97 0.07 0.92 
2007 16.20 0.023 0.95 0.06 0.89 
2008 16.50 0.028 0.91 0.06 0.84 
2009 16.10 0.022 1.16 0.07 0.97 
2010 16.70 0.022 1.17 0.07 0.95 
2011 17.60 0.025 1.34 0.08 0.96 
2012 17.20 0.023 1.20 0.07 0.97 
Average 12.98 0.026 0.98 0.08 0.92 
 
Note: The sample excludes firm/year observations with R&D intensity is greater than 1. All entries are based 
on aggregate values for each year and the full period. 
 
In contrast, the level of public funding (column 3) has increased and remained high from 2003-
2005 and from 2009-2012. Similarly, the subsidy intensity (the ratio of subsidy to privately-
funded R&D expenditures) and the coverage rate (the ratio of subsidized to total number of 
firms) are relatively higher in 2003-2004 and throughout 2009-2012.  This evidence suggests 
that the funder has been increasing the level of support during crisis periods, perhaps with a 
view to encourage R&D investment when the firm’s perceived risks and the cost of securing 
external finance were both higher due the downturn in the business cycle. We test our first 
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hypothesis (H1) to verify whether the funder’s increased support after the onset of financial 
crises has been associated with additionality or crowding-out effects. 
 
Table 3: R&D expenditures and UK subsidies: By age and size deciles 
(Pooled panel of 43,650 firms with 201,058 firm/year observations) 
 
 Private  
R&D Private R&D int. Subsidy Subsidy int. Coverage 
Panel A - By age deciles  (£ bn.) (Private R&D / turnover) (£ bn.) 
(Subsidy / 
private R&D) 
(Subsidized firms 
/ total firms) 
1st  decile: age ≤ 3 years 1.27 0.042 0.14 0.11 0.96 
2nd  decile: 3 < age ≤ 6 yrs.  3.25 0.038 0.14 0.04 0.94 
3rd  decile: 6 < age ≤ 9  yrs. 6.57 0.034 0.77 0.12 0.93 
4th  decile: 9 < age ≤ 11  yrs. 8.46 0.046 0.54 0.06 0.93 
5th  decile: 11 < age ≤ 14  yrs. 14.50 0.041 0.57 0.04 0.93 
6th  decile: 14 < age ≤ 17 yrs. 15.20 0.033 0.95 0.06 0.92 
7th  decile: 17 < age ≤ 22 yrs. 29.10 0.033 2.26 0.08 0.92 
8th  decile: 22 < age ≤ 26 yrs. 26.00 0.023 2.85 0.11 0.90 
9th  decile: 26 < age ≤ 31 yrs. 31.20 0.024 3.03 0.10 0.91 
10th  decile: age > 31 years 59.40 0.020 3.43 0.06 0.90 
Sample total or (average) 194.95 (0.026) 14.68 (0.08) (0.92) 
Share of top age decile (%) 30.47 n.a. 23.37 n.a. n.a. 
Panel B - By size deciles      
1st  decile: 1 employee 0.23 0.015 0.03 0.14 0.96 
2nd  decile: 2 employees 0.25 0.061 0.03 0.12 0.97 
3rd  decile: 3 or 4 employees 0.31 0.036 0.04 0.12 0.96 
4th  decile: 4<employees ≤ 9  0.70 0.028 0.07 0.10 0.95 
5th  decile: 9<employees≤ 15  0.95 0.017 0.06 0.07 0.94 
6th  decile: 15<employees≤ 25  1.52 0.029 0.09 0.06 0.94 
7th  decile: 25<employees≤ 43  2.49 0.023 0.13 0.05 0.93 
8th  decile: 43<employees≤ 83  4.93 0.020 0.22 0.04 0.92 
9th  decile: 83<employees≤ 205  11.20 0.024 0.34 0.03 0.91 
10th decile: >205 employees 172.00 0.026 13.70 0.08 0.80 
Sample total or (average) 194.95 (0.026) 14.68 (0.08) (0.92) 
Share of top size decile (%) 88.23 n.a. 93.32 n.a. n.a. 
 
Note: Excludes firm/year observations in the top 1% of the private R&D intensity distribution. 
n.a.: Not applicable 
 
Table 3 provides further descriptive information by age and size (employment) deciles. It is 
evident that firms in top-age and top-size deciles account for disproportionately higher 
proportions of the total subsidy - 23% and 93%, respectively. Secondly, the coverage rate falls 
slightly with age, but the subsidy intensity does not. Third, both the coverage rate and the 
subsidy intensity tend to fall with size, the subsidy intensity in the top size decile remains 
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relatively.  The fall in subsidy intensity with size is in line with Innovate UK’s eligibility criteria 
summarised in Table 1 above. However, the relative concentration of the subsidy among larger 
and older firms is evident and may entail high agency costs if the evidence lends support to our 
second and third hypotheses (H2 and H3) stated above. 
 
Key characteristics of the treated (subsidized) and untreated (non-subsidized) samples and 
those of the full sample are summarised in Table 4. Rows 2 and 6 indicate that subsidized firms 
are small R&D spenders and employ a small number of R&D personnel (scientists and 
technicians) compared to non-subsidized firms. The subsidized firms are also smaller than the 
non-subsidized firms in terms of turnover and total employment (rows 9 and 10). However, 
subsidized firms have a relatively higher R&D intensity (rows 3 and 4) and higher R&D 
personnel intensity (row 7) compared to non-subsidized firms.  
 
 
Table 4. R&D intensity and firm characteristics by treatment status 
 
 Non-subsidized 
(Untreated) 
Subsidized  
(Treated) 
Whole  
sample 
 Mean S.Dev. Mean S.Dev. Mean S.Dev. 
1.  Public subsidy (£ 1000) 0 0 79.09 3000.25 73.02 2882.97 
2.  Privately-funded R&D (£ 1000) 6065.9 45717.4 545.90 15372.05 969.28 19509.76 
3.  Private R&D to turnover .058 .146 .089 .150 .087 .150 
4.  Total R&D to turnover .058 .147 .101 .178 .098 .176 
5.  UK subsidy to turnover 0 0 .009 .042 .009 .040 
6.  R&D personnel employed 34.765 151.847 5.559 83.896 7.835 91.254 
7.  R&D personnel intensity 0.080 .236 .095 .194 .094 .198 
8.  Firm age (years) 19.244 10.263 17.087 10.386 17.253 10.392 
9.  Turnover (£ 1000) 153105 1081527 28371.2 425118.5 37938.2 507617.7 
10. Firm employment  70.952 8.125 20.863 5.680 22.897 6.025 
11.  Start-up dummy (< 3 years old) .133 .339 .256 .436 .247 .431 
12.Young dummy (< 7 years old) .154 .361 .213 .409 .208 .406 
13.Mature (> 14 years old) .624 .484 .537 .498 .544 .498 
14.Old (> 24 years old) .353 .478 .264 .441 .271 .444 
15.Small (<=25  employees) .338 .473 .565 .496 .547 .498 
16. SME (50 to 250 employees) .259 .438 .225 .418 .228 419 
17.Large firm (> 250 employees) .283 .450 .085 .279 .101 .301 
18.Survivor firm (until 2012) .707 .455 .744 .435 .742 .437 
Observations 15421  185637  201058  
Notes: Minimum and maximum values are excluded to comply with non-disclosure requirements of the data 
host. Excludes observations in the top 1% of the private R&D intensity distribution. 
 
Rows 11 and 12 indicate that start-ups and young firms are relatively more likely to be 
subsidized as opposed to non-subsidized. In contrast, mature and old firms are less likely to be 
subsidized as opposed to non-subsidized. We observe a similar pattern with respect to firm 
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size: whilst small firms (25 employees or less) are relatively more likely to be subsidized (row 
15), SMEs and large firms (rows 16 and 17) have a relatively lower probability of being 
subsidized. Finally, survivors (i.e., firms that did not exit during the sample period) have a 
relatively higher probability of being subsidized.  
These descriptive statistics indicate that UK funders (mostly Innovate UK) target the subsidy 
towards firm types that are more likely to create additionality according to H2 and H3. 
However, the evidence also reflects a preference towards funding firms with a higher level of 
R&D intensity on average. Also, although older and larger firms have a relatively lower 
probability of being subsidized, they still account for the major proportion of the total subsidy 
– mainly due to high coverage rates and size effects presented in Tables 2 and 3 above.  
 
Methodology 
 
Our aim is to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for privately-funded 
R&D intensity - and for the share of R&D personnel in total employment as a sensitivity check. 
The ATT is estimated by comparing the firm’s privately-funded R&D intensity (and share of 
R&D personnel) when it receives the subsidy with the same firm’s counterfactual outcome that 
would have been observed had it not received the subsidy. The counterfactuals are selected 
based on matching difference-in-difference estimations, which help to reduce biases that arise 
in the context of observational data (Heckman et al., 1998; Smith and Todd, 2005).  
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇௧=E(𝑌௜,௧ଵ  | 𝐗௧ିଵ, 𝑆௜,௧=1) - E(𝑌௜,௧଴  | 𝐗௧ିଵ, 𝑆௜௧=1)    (1) 
 
Here, t = 1, 2 …τ is the time dimension over which the data is pooled (when t > 1) or a single 
cross-section when t = 1; and i = 1, 2 …N is the number of firms in the sample. 𝑌௜,௧ଵ  is the 
outcome (privately-funded R&D intensity) of the treated firm; 𝑌௜,௧଴  is the counterfactual 
outcome of the same firm had it been untreated; 𝑆௜,௧ is the treatment status, which is 1 when 
the firm receives subsidy and 0 otherwise; Xt-1 is the set of pre-treatment (lagged) covariates 
that determine selection into treatment; and E is the expectation operator. 
 
It is obvious that the two outcomes are not observable at the same time. To ensure 
identification, we draw on the exchangeability condition which is satisfied if: (i) the treatment 
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is un-confounded when selection into treatment is conditioned on pre-treatment covariates Xt-
1; and (ii) there is sufficient overlap (or common support) between treated and control groups 
given the conditioning covariates in Xt-1 (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
 
Conditioning on all relevant covariates may be difficult if the covariates vector, Xt-1, is 
multidimensional. To address this problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest using the 
so-called balancing scores, which are a function of Xt-1. One such balancing score is the 
propensity score – i.e., the probability of selection into treatment given the observed covariates 
in Xt-1. The propensity score would also ensure conditional independence if the potential 
outcomes are independent of treatment conditional on covariates in Xt-1. Denoting the 
estimated propensity score as 𝑝పෝ (𝐗𝒕ି𝟏) = 𝑝పෝ ൫𝑆௜,௧ = 1 ห 𝐗𝒊,𝒕ି𝟏), the estimated ATT can be 
written as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇௧෣ = ൫𝑁ିଵ ∑ 𝑆௜,௧ே௜ୀଵ ൯
ିଵ
൜∑ [ௌ೔,೟ି௣ഢෞ൫𝐗𝒊,𝒕ష𝟏൯௒೔,೟
ଵି௣ഢෞ൫𝐗𝒊,𝒕ష𝟏൯
ே
௜ୀଵ ൠ    (2) 
 
The ATT estimator in (2) is shown to have the smallest asymptotic variance if the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA) is satisfied (Wooldridge, 2010). Also, Hirano et al. (2000) 
have demonstrated that it achieves the semiparametric efficiency bound obtained by Hahn 
(1998). Essentially, the ATT is the average of the difference between the potential outcomes 
for the treated and counterfactual (control) groups in the treated subsample; and the first term 
in (2), ൫𝑁ିଵ ∑ 𝑆௜,௧ே௜ୀଵ ൯
ିଵ
, is an unbiased estimator of the probability of treatment, i.e., 𝑃(𝑆௜,௧ =
1).7 The estimations are based on propensity score matching with pooled data (when τ > 1) and 
with cross-section data for each year (when τ = 1).  
 
We estimate the propensity scores with a probit estimator. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983), we use a flexible probit model, where X and various functions of X (e.g., quadratics 
and interactions) are included. The probit model is stated below. 
 
P(𝑆௧ = 1| 𝐗௧ିଵ) =  𝜱(𝐗௧ିଵ𝜷)      (3) 
 
                                                          
7 Although we report only ATTs in the paper, we have estimated ATEs too. The two are very close, with any 
difference usually observed in the third digit after the decimal point.  
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Here P(𝑆௧ = 1| 𝑋௧ିଵ) is probability of selection into treatment (receiving the R&D subsidy) 
conditional on the vector of one year lagged firm characteristics 𝐗௧ିଵ, 𝛷 is the standard normal 
distribution function, 𝜷 is a vector of parameters to be estimated; and 𝐗௧ିଵ is a vector of firm 
characteristics that impact on selection into treatment and outcome, as listed in Table A1 in the 
Appendix.  
 
The matching procedure is based on the statistical package of Leuven and Sianesi (2018); and 
carried out with both 1 and 10 nearest neighbours. The one-neighbour matching provides lower 
estimator bias but higher variance compared to the ten-neighbour matching (Caliedo and 
Kopeinig, 2008). The ATT is obtained by bootstrapping over 1,000 replications. 
 
Following Rubin (2001), Imbens and Rubin (2015) and Sianesi (2004), we conduct a range of 
diagnostic tests to verify the matching quality, which is necessary for satisfying the 
exchangeability condition. These include: (i) propensity score tests for mean equality of the 
covariates for treated and untreated firms; (ii) measures of mean and median standardised 
biases between the treatment and comparison groups; (iii) the extent of common support 
necessary to satisfy the overlapping condition; (iv) the pseudo R-squared after matching; and 
(v) the performance of the probit model in terms of correct classification and the area under the 
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. We conduct these diagnostics for all results 
based on different firm cohorts, different time periods and annual cross-sections.  
 
In addition to matching quality checks, we also compare the ATTs from the PSM estimator 
with those based on a doubly-robust (DR) estimator that provides some assurance against 
misspecification of the selection (propensity score) or outcome model (Emsley et al., 2008; 
Funk et al., 2011). Both PSM and DR require absence of unmeasured confounders, but they 
allow for causal inference similar to quasi randomized control trials. The advantage of the DR 
estimator is that it provides unbiased estimations if either the selection or outcome model is 
correctly specified. Simulations indicate that the DR estimator: (a) provides efficiency gains 
over inverse probability of treatment-weighted (IPTW) estimators (Emsley et al., 2008); and 
(b) is unbiased when a covariate is omitted from one (but not both) of the constituent models 
(Funk et al., 2011). However, the DR estimator may be less efficient than the PSM (Emsley et 
al., 2008).  
 
25 
 
The algorithm for the DR estimator can be stated as follows (Emsley et al., 2008): 
1. Estimate the selection model using the covariates that determine selection into 
treatment (subsidy); and obtain the estimated propensity scores; 
2. Predict the value of the outcome (privately-funded R&D intensity) in the treated group, 
given the covariates in the outcome model 
3. Predict the value of the outcome in the untreated group, given the covariates in the 
outcome model 
4. Find the difference between (2) and (3) 
5. To obtain the ATT, regress the difference in (4) on a constant and over the treated 
sample (i.e, when Si,t = 1), with bootstrapping. 
  
The covariates in the selection model of the DR estimator are the same as those used in the 
PSM estimations. On the other hand, the outcome model include the covariates in the selection 
model and three additional covariates that feature in R&D investment moels. These consist of 
the logarithm of firm age, the Herfindahl index of market concentration, and the square of the 
latter. The logarithm of age is included because it has been often reported as a determinant of 
R&D investment, with the latter declining with age (Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004; 
Balasubramanian and Lee, 2008). Market concentration at 3-digit industry level and its square 
are included in line with Schumpeterian models of competition and innovation that report an 
inverted-U relationship between competition and R&D investment (Aghion et al, 2005; Polder 
and Veldhuizen, 2012). 
 
As a further robustness check, we estimate the ATT for the effect of subsidy on the ratio of 
R&D personnel (scientists and technicians) to total employment. This is warranted for two 
reasons. First, the employment of R&D personnel is an important input measure of innovation 
and the extent of additionality in this input has both policy and welfare implications. Secondly, 
and more to the point here, it is important to verify if the treatment effects on the intensity of 
R&D personnel are similar to those related to R&D intensity; and whether the evidence on the 
former also tallies with our hypotheses stated above.  
 
The checks above notwithstanding, we are aware that the use of pooled panel data may pose 
some challenges for treatment-effect estimations. First, firms may be in receipt of subsidy for 
several times over the analysis period when the data is pooled. Therefore, it may be difficult to 
disentangle the effect of subsidy in a particular year from the effect of subsidies in previous 
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years. We address this issue by lagging the treatment (subsidy) indicator one and two years to 
verify if the effect-size estimate differs with lagged treatment. Secondly, the firm may receive 
subsidy from more than one funder over the estimation period – for example form UK and EU 
funders as it is the case in our data. To address this issue, we regress the stored treatment effects 
on a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm receives both UK and EU subsidies; 
and zero otherwise.8 The third issue is potential time-series dependence that is ignored in the 
calculation of the standard errors in most empirical work in the field. To address this issue, we 
use panel bootstrapping that resamples all time periods for each firm in the pooled data 
(Wooldridge, 2010).   
 
 
5.  Results 
 
Summary statistics for the covariates in the selection model are presented in Table A1 in the 
Appendix, whereas probit results for pooled data and selected cross-sections are presented in 
Table A2. The probit results indicate that firms with multi-plant units are more likely to receive 
the subsidy. Also, there is evidence of non-linear relationship between the probability of 
receiving the subsidy and firm size in terms of employment and turnover. The findings are 
usually similar for the whole period (1998-2012), selected years and firm types in terms of age 
and size. Given that the PSM estimator requires correct specification of the selection model, 
we ensure that the probit results satisfy four requirements: (i) it includes covariates that reflect 
the size-dependent criteria that Innovate UK utilizes for determining eligibility (Table 1); (ii) 
the rate of correct correctly classifying the subsidy status is satisfactory; (iii) the area under the 
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is large enough; and (iv) the model is conducive 
to satisfactory matching-quality diagnostics as suggested by Rubin (2001), Imbens and Rubin 
(2015), and Sianesi (2004).  
 
The selection model satisfies the first criterion in that it control for firm size and its square. The 
post-estimation statistics for the probit results (last 3 rows in Table A2 in the Appendix) also 
satisfy the second and third criteria because: (a) the area under the ROC curve is mostly over 
70%, a threshold considered satisfactory in observational data (Hosmer et al., 2013); and (b) 
                                                          
8 We find that the average treatment effect is smaller when the treatment dummy is lagged one year or two years. 
However, the average treatment effect is larger if the firm receives both EU and UK subsidies. The results are not 
reported here but they can be provided on request.  
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the rate of correct classification is over 90%. These statistics indicate that the model is 
satisfactory in distinguishing between the treated and untreated firms; and it correctly identifies 
more than 90% of the firms receiving subsidy.  
 
ATTs for privately-funded R&D intensity with bootstrapped standard errors are presented in 
Tables 5 and 6. 9 Whilst Table 5 reports the results for the whole sample, two sub-periods and 
for cross sections in each year; Table 6 reports the results by firm age and size over the whole 
period.  
 
The matching quality statistics in Tables 5 and 6 are highly satisfactory and well within the 
ranges suggested by Rubin (2001) and Imbens and Rubin (2015). The mean and median bias 
are less than 5% for almost all periods (except 2007 where the mean bias is 5% but the median 
bias is 3%). Secondly, the absolute standardized differences of the means for treated and 
control groups is less than the conventional level of 25%. Also, after matching, the pseudo R-
squared is close to zero and indicates that the matching covariates have little joint explanatory 
power in explaining the selection in the matched samples. This statistic lends support to the 
orthogonality condition of the treatment, conditional on the propensity scores (Sianesi, 2004). 
Finally, both the results in the last column of Tables 5 and 6 and the graphical diagnostics in 
Figure A1 in the Appendix indicate good common support and satisfactory balancing of the 
covariates after matching.  
 
Having verified the predictive power of the selection model and the quality of matching, we 
can now verify the consistency of the ATT estimates between the DR and PSM estimators.10  
Out of 28 result pairs, 90% reflect sign and significance consistency between PSM and DR 
estimations. The difference between the ATT pairs is observed in 2004, 2010 and 2011, where 
the DR estimator indicates crowding-out effects, but the PSM estimator indicates no effect for 
2004 and 2010, and a small additionality effect for 2011. The results across two estimators are 
also quite similar in terms of magnitude. The magnitude of the treatment effect is similar in 
                                                          
9 We carry out panel bootstrapping when the data is pooled and normal bootstrapping for cross-sections, all with 
1,000 replications. 
10 The average treatment effects in the population (ATEs) is similar to the ATTs reported here, with difference 
between the two mostly observed in the third digit after the decimal point. ATEs are not reported here, but they 
are available on request.  
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82% of the result pairs, with the exception of the second sub-period (2008-2012) and years 
2004, 2006, 2009 and 201011. 
Table 5: ATTs for UK subsidy and private R&D intensity 
(DR and one-neighbour PSM estimators, by periods and years} 
 
 
Period/Year 
Double 
Robust 
PSM  
 
Mean 
Bias (%) 
Median 
Bias 
(%) 
Balance 
(%) 
Pseudo 
𝑹𝟐 
Observations on 
common support 
1998-2012 .0304*** 
(.0015) 
.0289*** 
(.0011) 0.3 0.2 
3.0 
 
0.000 
 
Untreated: 14,989 
Treated: 179,533 
1998-2007 .0434*** 
(.0016) 
.0404*** 
(.0018) 1.3 0.7 
5.6 
 
0.000 
 
Untreated: 9,731 
Treated: 94,285 
2008-2012 .0102*** 
(.0024) 
.0169*** 
(.0024) 0.5 0.7 
5.0 
 
0.000 
 
Untreated: 5,258 
Treated: 85,214 
1998 .0392*** 
(.0045) 
.0434*** 
(.0048) 
2.7 
 2.5 
9.8 
 
0.002 
 
Untreated: 1,062 
Treated: 6,636 
1999 .0520*** 
(.0048) 
.0525*** 
(.0060) 0.6 0.6 
12.3 
 
0.003 
 
Untreated: 946 
Treated: 5,990 
2000 .0620*** 
(.0031) 
.0608*** 
(.0040) 0.7 0.6 
7.6 
 
0.001 
 
Untreated: 1,752 
Treated: 5,991 
2001 .0376*** 
(.0086) 
.0392*** 
(.0096) 
0.4 
 0.2 
8.0 
 
0.001 
 
Untreated: 417 
Treated: 6,951 
2002 .0140*** 
(.0011) 
.0265*** 
(.0086) 0.9 0.5 
8.7 
 
0.002 
 
Untreated: 556 
Treated: 9,096 
2003 -.0588*** 
(.0221) 
-.0663*** 
(.0229) 
1.9 
 
2.5 
 
20.4 
 
0.007 
 
Untreated: 240 
Treated: 7,603 
2004 -.0194* 
(.0150) 
-.0068 
(.0128) 
1.4 
 
1.0 
 
7.0 
 
0.001 
 
Untreated: 371 
Treated: 9,380 
2005 .0538*** 
(.0047) 
.0518*** 
(.0040) 2.1 0.8 
11.9 
 
0.003 
 
Untreated: 1,144 
Treated: 10,719 
2006 .0116*** 
(.0047) 
.0199*** 
(.0037) 
4.4 
 2.6 
17.0 
 
0.005 
 
Untreated: 1,216 
Treated: 14,657 
2007 .0220*** 
(.0042) 
.0243*** 
(.0032) 
5.0 
 3.0 
18.1 
 
0.006 
 
Untreated: 2,021 
Treated: 16,776 
2008 .0429*** 
(.0032) 
.0485*** 
(.0037) 
1.6 
 1.4 
9.9 
 
0.002 
 
Untreated: 2,598 
Treated: 12,990 
2009 -.0656*** 
(.0013) 
-.0472*** 
(.0104) 2.2 1.6 
13.4 
 
0.003 
 
Untreated: 522 
Treated: 17,285 
2010 -.0216*** 
(.0091) 
.0108 
(.0071) 0.3 0.3 
3.3 
 
0.000 
 
Untreated: 799 
Treated: 16,269 
2011 -.0055** 
(.0053) 
.0159** 
(.0072) 
1.0 
 0.8 
3.7 
 
0.002 
 
Untreated: 786 
Treated: 18,203 
2012 -.0458*** 
(.0046) 
-.0403*** 
(.0105) 
1.1 
 1.0 
11.6 
 
0.002 
 
Untreated: 552 
Treated: 20,069 
Notes: PSM is based on 1-neighbour matching. Mean Bias, Median Bias, Pseudo 𝑅ଶ and Balance are post-
matching diagnostics. Conventionally, the balance should be less than 25% (Rubin, 2001). All covariates for 
matching are the same (see Table A1) and lagged one year. The outcome variable is ln(Private R&D intensity + 
1), where private R&D intensity, the ratio of R&D expenditures to firm turnover, ranges between 0 and 1. Standard 
errors (in brackets) are based on bootstrapping with 1000 iterations of random sampling.  
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
                                                          
11 This pattern of consistency (and occasional divergence) is also observed in tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix, 
where the PSM is based on ten-nearest-neighbour matching.  
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The evidence in both tables confirms that the treatment effect is heterogeneous and this is in 
line with the literature reviewed above. The ATT over the full period (1998-2012) is positive 
but small (0.0263). It indicates that the average R&D intensity of the treated firms would have 
been 2.63% lower had there been no public support.12 The ATT is smaller in the second period 
(2008-2012) and varies between years (Table 5) and between firm types (Table 6). Across two 
tables, 30 results (53.5%) indicate additionality effects, 22 results (39.4%) indicate crowding-
out effects and 4 results (7.1%) indicate no effect. In Table 5, the statistically-significant 
additionality effect ranges between 1.2% and 6.2%, and the crowding-out effect varies from -
0.6% to -6.6%. Similarly we observe heterogeneity in the statistically-significant ATTs in 
Table 6 too, where the additionality effect ranges from 1.7% to 7%, and substitution effects 
from -2% to -5.8%.  
 
A highly similar pattern emerges in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix, where matching is 
conducted with 10 nearest neighbours. Furthermore, the pattern is almost the same in Tables 
A5 and A6 in the Appendix, where we report ATTs for the effect of the public support on the 
ratio of R&D personnel (scientists and technicians) to total firm employment.  
 
Given this variation, we recommend that future research adopt a systematic approach aimed at 
discovering the sources of heterogeneity in the treatment effects – particularly, when the latter 
is about the effect of public support on innovation inputs (business R&D investment or 
employment of R&D personnel). Otherwise, ATT estimates based on aggregate samples 
covering different periods or different firm types are likely to conceal a high degree of 
heterogeneity and as such would constitute a poor basis for evidence-based public policy.  
 
Having noted that, we can now proceed to verify if the findings lend support to our hypotheses 
about the sources of heterogeneity in the ATTs. Our findings in Table 5 concerning privately-
funded R&D intensity lend reasonable support to the first hypothesis (H1), which posits that 
the ATTs would be smaller or indicate crowding-out effects after the onset of financial crises. 
Indeed, the ATTs are smaller or negative: (i) after the bursting of the dot.com bubble from 
2003-2004; and (ii) after the onset of the global financial crisis from 2009-2012.13 During these 
                                                          
12 Note from Table 4 that the privately-funded R&D intensity in the treated sample is 0.089. Had there been no 
treatment, the privately-funded R&D intensity would have been 0.0865. 
13 The trough for the dot-com bubble crisis is 2002 (Lowenstein, 2004); and for the global financial crisis it is 
2009 (Bartram and Bodnar, 2009). 
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post-crisis periods, firms tended to substitute public subsidy for privately-funded R&D as their 
incentive constraints have tightened due to risk aversion under incomplete contracting. 
Crowding-out or insignificant effects after the financial crises are also observed in Table A5 in 
the Appendix, where we report the treatment effects on the employment of R&D personnel 
(scientists and technicians).   
 
We relate these results to risk-aversion under incomplete contracting. On the one hand, risk-
averse firms would either reduce R&D investment or seek added insurance as the onset of the 
crisis leads lower expected growth and higher costs of external finance for R&D investment 
(Acemoglu and Linn, 2005; Bloom, 2007; and Dubois et al., 2015). On the other hand, the 
absence of an enforcement mechanism in the subsidy contract and increased noise in R&D 
investment as an indicator effort would reduce the ability of the funder to ensure R&D 
additionality. Under these conditions, the actual allocations of the subsidy and R&D investment 
deviate from the first-best allocations and increases the probability of observing substitution 
effects or no effects on privately-funded R&D investment.  
 
In the data, we observe substitution effects or absence of additionality effects approximately 
one year after the trough of the two crises. This is in line with Hud and Hussinger (2015), who 
report crowding-out effects from German data in 2009. However, our findings contribute to 
existing knowledge about the relationship between financial crises and effect-size 
heterogeneity in two ways. First, we demonstrate that substitution effects or absence of 
additionality effects are not limited to the recent crisis only. Secondly, we demonstrate that 
such second-best outcomes are underpinned by risk aversion and incomplete contracting. 
Therefore, similar outcomes are likely to be observed during future crisis episodes too. With 
respect to the UK context, our findings indicate that UK funders (mostly Innovate UK and its 
predecessor) have moved to satisfy the incentive constraints of the risk-averse firms by 
increasing the level of subsidy, its intensity and the coverage rate after the onset of the crisis. 
However, the move does not appear to have induced the desired additionality effects. 
According to contract theory, this is due to a combination of two factors: either the increased 
subsidy did not provide sufficient insurance for the risk-averse firms or the latter have extracted 
agency rents due to incomplete contracting.  
 
Turning to Table 6, we observe that the ATTs vary with firm age and size. The results indicate 
higher additionality effects among younger and smaller firms, but crowding-out effects among 
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older and larger firms. The same pattern is observed in table A6 in the Appendix, where we 
report the effects of the subsidy on the employment of R&D personnel by firm type. In both 
sets of results, the ATTs decline with age and size and eventually indicates higher substitution 
effects as age and size increases14. These findings lend strong support to our second and third 
hypotheses (H2 and H3), which posits that older and larger firms are more likely to benefit 
from concealing their true types in terms of R&D efficiency. 
 
Table 6: ATTs for UK subsidy and private R&D intensity 
(DR and one-neighbour PSM estimators, by firm age and size types) 
Outcome variable: log(private R&D intensity + 1) 
Firm type Double 
Robust 
PSM  
 
Mean 
Bias 
(%) 
Median 
Bias 
(%) 
Balance  
 
(%) 
Pseudo 
𝑹𝟐 
Observations on 
common support 
 
Firm type by age 
       
Start-ups from 1998 
to 2007 
.0694*** 
(.0006) 
.0701*** 
(.0053) 
0.9 
 
0.7 
 
13.0 
 
0.003 
 
Untreated: 851 
Treated: 14,398 
Start-ups from 2008 
to 2012 
.0165*** 
(.0004) 
.0278*** 
(.0072) 
2.8 
 
2.5 
 
19.2 
 
0.007 
 
Untreated: 1,046 
Treated: 28,575 
Young1: <= 7 years  .0361*** 
(.0003) 
.0413*** 
(.0048) 
2.1 
 
1.8 
 
14.5 
 
0.004 
 
Untreated: 1,898 
Treated: 42,995 
Young2: > 7 and < 
=14 years  
.0193*** 
(.0002) 
.0205*** 
(.0012) 0.4 0.4 3.4 0.000 
Untreated: 12,820 
Treated: 144,854 
Mature: >14 years  -.0570***    
(.0003) 
-.0559*** 
(.0036) 
1.5 
 
1.5 
 
9.3 
 
0.002 
 
Untreated: 3,402 
Treated: 12,571 
Old: > 24 years  -.0492***    
(.0003) 
-.0495*** 
(.0038) 
1.4 
 
1.4 
 
9.7 
 
0.002 
 
Untreated: 2,291 
Treated: 8,405 
Firm type by size        
Small: > 10 and < 50 
employees 
.0271*** 
(.0001) 
.0276*** 
(.0017) 
0.8 
 
0.5 
 
2.9 
 
0.000 
 
Untreated: 4,110 
Treated: 57,545 
SMEs: >=50 and 
<=250 employees 
-.0199*** 
(.0002) 
-.0221*** 
(.0024) 
1.0 
 
1.0 
 
3.4 
 
0.000 
 
Untreated: 3,909 
Treated: 41,293 
Firms in the upper 
quartile: >=60 
employees 
-.0352***   
(.0002) 
-.0338*** 
(.0024) 
0.6 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
6.2 
 
 
0.001 
 
 
Untreated: 7,678 
Treated: 50,885 
Large: > 250 
employees 
-.0559*** 
(.0002) 
-.0581*** 
(.0034) 
1.7 
 
1.6 
 
9.4 
 
0.004 
 
Untreated: 4,266 
Treated: 15,480 
 
Notes: See Table 5. 
 
Results in Table 6 indicate that the decay in the estimated ATTs becomes observable at 
surprisingly younger ages and smaller sizes. Indeed, subsidies start to be associated with 
crowding-out effects when the firm age is over 14 years and the firm size is 50 employees or 
more. To verify whether these results may be reflecting a potential bias due to pooled data, we 
regressed the stored treatment effects on age and size deciles over the full period and for cross-
sections in every year. Some of results are presented in Figure 1, where we plot the conditional 
                                                          
14 Note that the additionality effects among start-ups are lower during the second sub-period (2008-2012), which 
covers the extended recession after the global financial crisis.  
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elasticities of the treatment effect with respect to age and size deciles for the full period (Panel 
A) followed by those for a typical year 2000 (Panel B).  
 
Figure 1: Conditional elasticities of the ATTs with respect to age and size deciles15 
 
Panel A: Pooled data from 1998-2012 
 
 
Panel B: Cross-section data for year 2000 only 
 
The results indicate that the decay’s pattern is strikingly similar between pooled data and the 
annual cross sections. The wider range for the elasticities in year 2000 compared to the full 
                                                          
15 The graphs in Figure 1 are based on the following regression: 𝑇𝑇௜௝ = 𝐴𝑇𝑇଴ + 𝐃𝜸 + 𝜀௜௝, where TT is the stored 
value of each matched outcome in the treated sample; 𝐴𝑇𝑇଴ is the average treatment effect when all age or size 
deciles are zero; i is firm; j is age or size decile from 1 to 10; 𝐃 is a vector of cut-off points for age or size deciles; 
𝜸 is vector of parameters on age and size decile cut-off values; and 𝜀 is the error term. We used Stata’s margins 
command to obtain the conditional marginal effects of age and size on ATTs as elasticities. Results for other years 
have similar trends. Also, the results are similar for treatment effects on employment intensity of R&D personnel. 
The latter are not reported here to avoid overcrowding, but both sets are available on request. 
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period is to be expected because the ATT in 2000 is 0.0608 compared to the ATT of 0.0263 in 
the full sample. Note that a negative elasticity does not indicate crowding-out, but it does 
indicate that the ATT would get smaller as age or size increases. We see that the crowding-out 
effect becomes observable after the second age and size deciles in the pooled data and in the 
cross-section for 2000, where the magnitude of the negative elasticity begins to be larger than 
the ATT in the relevant sample. Therefore, we conclude that the age- and size-dependent 
decline in the ATTs reported in Table 6 is not likely to be biased due to time dependence in the 
pooled data.  
 
Finally, we investigate whether our fourth hypothesis is supported by the data. H4 posits that 
the treatment effect will follow an inverted-U pattern when evaluated against the distribution 
of the R&D intensity in the sample. To verify this relationship, we regressed the stored ATTs 
from the pooled data and from the yearly cross-sections on R&D intensity and its square. The 
results, expressed as conditional elasticities of ATTs with respect to R&D intensity, are 
presented in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Conditional elasticities of the ATTs  
with respect to privately-funded R&D intensity percentiles16 
 
Pooled data for 1998-2012   Based on data for 2000 
                                                          
16 The graphs in Figure 2 are based on the following regression: 𝑇𝑇௜௝ = 𝐴𝑇𝑇଴ + 𝐑𝐃𝝁 + 𝑣௜௝. Here RD is the cut-
off values for the privately-funded R&D intensity percentiles and 𝝁 is the set of parameters. Other terms and the 
derivation of the conditional elasticities are as explained in note 15 above. The results are similar when the stored 
treatment effects are regressed on total R&D intensity; and for treatment effects on employment intensity of R&D 
personnel. The latter are not reported here to avoid overcrowding, but bot sets are available on request. 
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It can be observed that the ATTs are larger than the average as the R&D intensity increases 
until about the 35th percentile of the R&D intensity in both pooled and cross-section data. 
Thereafter, the elasticity of the treatment effect with respect to R&D intensity declines and 
becomes negative after the 75th percentile in the full sample and the 60th percentile in 2000. 
Because the confidence intervals are wide in the pooled sample, we can infer a crowding-out 
effect at 10% significance from the 85th percentile onwards. However, we can infer a crowding 
–out effect from the 65th percentile onward in the cross section for 2000.17 These results lend 
support to hypothesis H4, which posits that the ATT would follow an inverted-U pattern when 
evaluated against the distribution of the R&D intensity. 
The quadratic relationship between ATTs and R&D intensity is driven by the changing balance 
between the complementarities of the research effort and research productivity to R&D 
investment. As indicated earlier, the subsidy is more (less) likely to be associated with 
additionality effects when the complementarity of the firm’s research effort with R&D 
investment is larger (smaller) than the complementarity of research productivity with R&D 
investment. As the complementarity of the research productivity dominates at higher levels of 
R&D intensity, the firm can extract additional informational rents by pretending to be a low-
productivity type, and this leads to either crowding-out or smaller additionality effects. Given 
that the R&D intensity of the subsidized firms is approximately 50% higher than the R&D 
intensity of the non-subsidized firms in the data (Table 4), the UK funder’s targeting of 
relatively more R&D-intensive firms is in line with the predictions of the contract theory. The 
latter expects the principal to use the observed R&D as a proxy for unobserved research effort 
and productivity. However, reliance on proxy performance indicators does not resolve the 
agency problem that, in this case, emerges as a tendency of the more efficient firms mimicking 
the low-efficiency firms and thereby extracting informational rents.  
 
Conclusions 
 
We have investigated the effects of UK subsidies on privately-funded R&D intensity and 
employment of R&D personnel using a sample of 43,650 R&D-active UK firms from 1998 to 
                                                          
17 This is because the magnitude of the negative elasticity is larger than the ATT in after these deciles in both 
samples, with the implication that the ATT falls by more than the average in the sample when R&D intensity 
increases by one percent. 
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2012. The results are obtained from double-robust and matching difference-in-difference 
estimators with different degrees of control for self-selection and heterogeneity. The matching 
quality across almost all covariates and sub-samples are satisfactory, and the estimated results 
are highly consistent across estimators and innovation inputs.  
 
Our findings are in line with insights from the contract theory, which predicts that public 
support for R&D would be conducive to second-best allocations of the subsidy and of the R&D 
effort in the presence of risk aversion and asymmetric information about the firms’ true types. 
We find that the ATT is smaller or indicates crowding-out effects among older and larger firms, 
which have relatively higher levels of efficiency in converting the R&D investment into quality 
innovations/products. We also find that, in the absence of a third-party enforcer of the contract, 
risk aversion and non-verifiability of the effort due to noisy proxies for performance combine 
to generate substitution or insignificant effects roughly one year after the onset of financial 
crises. Finally, we find that the treatment effect follows an inverted-U pattern when evaluated 
against R&D intensity. The latter finding is also explained by the theory of contracts, which 
predicts substitution effects or smaller additionality effects when the complementarity of the 
firm’s research productivity (i.e., its efficiency in converting the R&D inputs into quality 
products/innovations) with R&D investment dominates the complementarity of its research 
effort with R&D investment. Our findings are highly consistent across two estimators (DR and 
PSM) and two innovation inputs (privately-funded R&D intensity and intensity of R&D 
personnel employment).  
 
One implication of our analysis for future empirical work is that treatment effects based on 
pooled samples or cross-sections of heterogeneous firm types may conceal a high degree of 
heterogeneity; and as such, they provide a poor basis for evidence-based public policy. Another 
implication is that firm-level panel data with repeated treatments poses some challenges for 
empirical work, but also provides opportunities for tracing the level of heterogeneity in the 
treatment effects and for identifying the observable sources thereof. The third implication can 
be stated as follows: given the extent of heterogeneity in the treatment effects, future research 
should pay more attention to the theoretical underpinnings of effect-size heterogeneity. In this 
article, we have drawn on the theory of contracts to demonstrate that the principal-agent 
problems that arise under information asymmetries and contract incompleteness go a long way 
in explaining effect-size heterogeneity. We encourage further testing of the insights from 
contract theory and further modelling of alternative mechanism designs.  
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A key policy implication of our findings is that public support for R&D investment cannot 
deliver first-best outcomes (induce optimal R&D investment) when firm research efforts and 
research productivity types are unobservable and represent private knowledge of the firm. The 
observed level of R&D investment is an imperfect/noisy indicator of true innovation 
performance or a true firm type, hence public subsidization and monitoring of business R&D 
investment are highly likely to produce second-best outcomes that involve either sub-optimal 
additionality effects or substitution effects. We show in this paper that these effects depend on 
firm age, size, R&D intensity, and business cycle conditions. In addition to supporting cash-
constrained small and young companies, public support for R&D should rely more on ex post 
rewards for realised innovations that satisfy social-welfare criteria as demonstrated by Akcigit 
et al. (2017) in the context of the US R&D tax credits system, instead of schemes solely aimed 
at reducing the cost of R&D investment ex ante. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A1: Summary statistics for covariates in the selection model* 
 Firms without 
R&D subsidy 
Firms with R&D 
subsidy 
All 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Outcome  .049 .113 .077 .117 .075 .117 
UK subsidy dummy  .049 .113 .077 .117 .075 .117 
Log (employment)  4.262 2.095 3.038 1.737 3.131 1.796 
Log (employment squared) 22.557 19.617 12.248 12.617 13.039 13.565 
Log (number of local units) 2.250 4.808 1.087 4.020 1.243 4.149 
Log(deflated turnover)  8.708 2.727 7.190 2.394 7.307 2.455 
Log(deflated turnover) squared 83.277 48.504 57.439 35.706 59.422 37.482 
Log(deflated turnover)* 
Log(employment) 
42.202 30.584 25.659 21.212 26.928 22.507 
Log (employment)*(numb. of local 
units) 
87.68 1418.54 21.687 601.531 26.749 699.089 
Number of local units 9.492 122.426 2.964 55.711 3.465 63.389 
Observations 15421  185637  201058  
* Minimum and maximum values are not reported to comply with non-disclosure requirements of the data host, 
UK Data Service. Firm/year observations with privately-funded R&D intensity larger than one are excluded. The 
estimation period is from 1998 to 2012. All covariates are lagged one year in the estimations.  
 
Table A2: Selected probit estimation results and post-estimation diagnostics  
 Full 
sample 
Year 
2001 
Year 
2009 
Year 
2012 
Mature 
firms 
Large 
firms 
Log (employment)  .021 0.055 0.194* 0.197** 0.149*** -1.203*** 
Log (employment squared) -.018*** -0.014* -0.051** 0.005 -0.030*** 0.068*** 
Log (number of local units) .024*** 0.029** 0.006** 0.018*** 0.058*** 0.004*** 
Log(deflated turnover)  .118** 0.221*** 0.030** 0.048 0.094* 0.449*** 
Log(deflated turnover) squared -.012*** -0.020*** -0.010** -0.003 -0.012*** -0.021*** 
Log(deflated turnover)* Log(employment) .00003*** 0.000 0.081*** -0.034* 0.000 0.000 
Log (employment)*(numb. of local units) -.0015*** -0.0018** -0.0004** -0.0002* -0.004*** -0.0002** 
Observations 201058 7494 17814 20681 157680 19752 
Area under ROC curve (%) 70.94 75.4 78.49 72.28 69.6 70.43 
Correct classification (%) 92.24 94.62 97.06 97.30 91.95 88.44 
Positive predictive value 92.36 94.35 97.11 97.37 91.82 88.68 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All covariates are lagged one year. 
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Figure A1: Matching diagnostics for selected samples 
 
1: Full sample from 1998-2012 
 
 
 
2: Year 2000 
 
 
 
3: Year 2009 
 
 
  
44 
 
Figure A1: Matching diagnostics (continued) 
 
 
4: Year 2012 
 
 
 
5: Mature Firms 
  
 
 
6: Large Firms (Employment > 250) 
 
Note: * Matching diagnostic graphs for other cohorts and periods are not reported here, but they are 
available on request.  
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Table A3: UK subsidy and private R&D intensity: 
(ATTs based on ten-neighbour PSM by sub-periods and years) 
 
Period/Year PSM  
(10N) 
Mean 
Bias (%) 
Median 
Bias (%) 
Balance 
(%) 
Pseudo 
𝑹𝟐 
Observations on 
common support 
1998-2012 .0301*** 
(.0013) 0.4 0.2 2.7 0.000 
Untreated: 14,989 
Treated: 179,533 
1998-2007 .0405*** 
(.0011) 0.9 1.0 4.8 0.000 
Untreated: 9,731 
Treated: 94,285 
2008-2012 .0131*** 
(.0023) 0.5 0.6 4.1 0.000 
Untreated: 5,258 
Treated: 85,214 
1998 .0421*** 
(.0041) 0.7 0.5 8.2 0.001 
Untreated: 1,062 
Treated: 6,636 
1999 .0540*** 
(.0048) 1.1 0.9 12.1 0.003 
Untreated: 946 
Treated: 5,990 
2000 .0591*** 
(.0024) 0.7 0.7 7.0 0.001 
Untreated: 1,752 
Treated: 5,991 
2001 .0375*** 
(.0102) 1.0 1.3 7.4 0.001 
Untreated: 417 
Treated: 6,951 
2002 .0232*** 
(.0071) 0.8 0.3 10.5 0.003 
Untreated: 556 
Treated: 9,096 
2003 -.0556*** 
(.0166) 1.4 0.4 20.0 0.007 
Untreated: 240 
Treated: 7,603 
2004 -.0093 
(.0111) 1.1 1.4 7.2 0.001 
Untreated: 371 
Treated: 9,380 
2005 .0560*** 
(.0038) 3.0 1.3 12.4 0.003 
Untreated: 1,144 
Treated: 10,719 
2006 .0170*** 
(.0042) 3.9 2.3 16.9 0.005 
Untreated: 1,216 
Treated: 14,657 
2007 .0242*** 
(.0033) 3.8 2.6 14.5 0.005 
Untreated: 2,021 
Treated: 16,776 
2008 .0493*** 
(.0032) 1.7 1.4 13.8 0.003 
Untreated: 2,598 
Treated: 12,990 
2009 -.0564*** 
(.0094) 1.3 0.9 12.0 0.003 
Untreated: 522 
Treated: 17,285 
2010 .0013 
(.0058) 0.3 0.3 5.3 0.001 
Untreated: 799 
Treated: 16,269 
2011 .0149** 
(.0059) 1.0 0.7 8.3 0.001 
Untreated: 786 
Treated: 18,203 
2012 -.0405*** 
(.0092) 1.2 1.3 12.2 0.003 
Untreated: 552 
Treated: 20,069 
Notes: 10N – ten nearest neighbor matching; DR estimation results (in Table 5 in the main text) are not 
reproduced here. For other notes, see Table 5. 
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Table A4: UK subsidy and private R&D intensity: 
(ATTs based on ten-neighbour PSM by firm type) 
 
Firm type PSM 
(10N) 
Mean 
Bias 
(%) 
Median 
Bias 
(%) 
Balance 
(%) 
Pseudo 
𝑹𝟐 
Observations on 
common support 
Firm type by age       
Start-ups from 1998 to 2007 .0734*** 
(.0049) 1.2 0.7 18.8 0.006 
Start-ups from 
1998 to 2007 
Start-ups from 2008 to 2012 .0263*** 
(.0061) 3.4 3.7 24.4 0.014 
Start-ups from 
2008 to 2012 
Young1: 3 years old or less .0481*** 
(.0038) 1.7 1.6 16.4 0.005 
 
Young2: less than 7 years old  
 
.0197*** 
(.0012) 0.3 0.3 16.6 0.005 
Untreated: 12,820 
Treated: 144,854 
       
Start-ups from 2008 to 2012 .0263*** 
(.0061) 3.4 3.7 24.4 0.014 
Untreated: 1,046 
Treated: 28,575 
Mature: over 14 years  -.0563*** 
(.0028) 1.2 1.1 18.6 0.006 
Untreated: 3,402 
Treated: 12,571 
Old: over 24 years  -.0471*** 
(.0029) 1.0 1.2 22.2 0.009 
Untreated: 2,291 
Treated: 8,405 
Firm type by size       
Small: between 10 and 50 
employees 
.0269*** 
(.0016) 0.6 0.4 2.6 0.001 
Untreated: 4,110 
Treated: 57,545 
SMEs: between 50 and 250 
employees 
-.0214*** 
(.0021) 0.4 0.2 5.9 0.001 
Untreated: 3,909 
Treated: 41,293 
Firms in upper quartile of 
employment: 60 and more 
employees 
-.0362*** 
(.0018) 0.6 0.7 12.5 0.003 
Untreated: 7,678 
Treated: 50,885 
Large: 250 and more 
employees 
-.0564*** 
(.0027) 1.3 1.3 18.6 0.006 
Untreated: 4,266 
Treated: 15,480 
Notes: 10N – ten nearest neighbor matching; DR estimation results (in Table 6 in the main text) are not 
reproduced here. For other notes, see Table 5. 
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Table A5: UK subsidy and employment of R&D personnel: 
(ATTs from one-neighbour PSM by sub-periods and years) 
 
Period PSM Mean 
Bias 
(%) 
Median 
Bias 
(%) 
Balance 
 
(%) 
Pseudo 
R2 
 
Observations on 
common support 
1998-2012 .0279 *** 
(.0014) 2.2 2.2 7.3 
0.001 
 
Untreated: 14,830 
Treated: 178,842 
1998-2007 .0380*** 
( .0017) 3.2 3.1 11.3 0.002 
Untreated: 9,637 
Treated: 93,880 
2008-2012 .0122*** 
(.0027) 1.5 1.5 8.5 0.001 
Untreated: 5,193 
Treated: 85,034 
1998 .0857*** 
(.0042) 4.1 5.9 12.1 0.003 
Untreated: 1,052 
Treated: 6,604 
1999 .1032*** 
(.0049) 1.2 1.3 9.5 0.002 
Untreated: 937 
Treated: 5,931 
2000 .0681*** 
(.0034) 2.4 2.4 11.9 0.003 
Untreated: 1,751 
Treated: 5,950 
2001 .0213*** 
(.0104) 2.0 0.4 16.4 0.005 
Untreated: 402 
Treated: 6,935 
2002 -.0007 
(.0094) 3.9 3.8 17.2 0.005 
Untreated: 549 
Treated: 9,059 
2003 -.0446** 
(.0275) 1.2 1.2 19.5 0.005 
Untreated: 233 
Treated: 7,515 
2004 .0007 
(.0176) 4.7 3.5 25.7 0.007 
Untreated: 362 
Treated: 9,274 
2005 .0473*** 
(.0057) 3.7 3.1 17.7 0.006 
Untreated: 1,139 
Treated: 10,688 
2006 .0027 
(.0059) 2.3 1.6 11.2 0.002 
Untreated: 1,205 
Treated: 14,648 
2007 .0108*** 
(.0040) 2.3 2.2 7.3 0.003 
Untreated: 2,005 
Treated: 16,755 
2008 .0466*** 
( .0030) 1.8 1.6 9.6 0.002 
Untreated: 2,587 
Treated: 12,947 
2009 -.0376*** 
(.0110) 1.7 1.1 14.6 0.004 
Untreated: 513 
Treated: 17,256 
2010 -.0105  
(.0103) 5.7 5.9 26.5 0.006 
Untreated: 785 
Treated: 16,217 
2011 -.0033 
(.0094) 3.0 3.5 19.2 0.006 
Untreated: 772 
Treated: 18,060 
2012 -.0356*** 
(.0115) 5.2 5.1 18.0 0.006 
Untreated: 36 
Treated: 20,019 
Notes: The outcome variable is ln(R&D personnel intensity + 1). DR results are in line with the PSM results 
in terms of sign, significance and magnitude. They are not reported here, but they are available on request. 
For other notes, see Table 5. 
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Table A6: UK subsidy and employment of R&D personnel:  
(ATTs based on one-neighbour PSM by firm type) 
 
Subsample of firms PSM Mean 
Bias 
(%) 
Median 
Bias 
(%) 
Balance 
 
(%) 
Pseudo 
R2 
 
Observations on 
common support 
 
Firm type by age 
      
Start-ups from 1998 to 2007 .0594*** 
(.0057) 3.0 2.7 20.4 0.007 
Untreated: 828 
Treated: 14,300 
Start-ups from 2008 to 2012 .0302*** 
(.0083) 1.1 0.6 13.9 0.004 
Untreated: 1,008 
Treated: 28,431 
Young 1: 7 years or less  .0407*** 
(.0047) 1.7 0.7 10.5 0.002 
Untreated: 1,836 
Treated: 42,750 
Young 2: over 7 years or 
below 14 years  
 
.0173*** 
(.0016) 2.3 2.0 8.2 0.001 
Untreated: 12,711 
Treated: 144,471 
Mature: over 14 years -.0588*** 
( .0033) 3.2 0.8 14.3 0.004 
Untreated: 3,396 
Treated: 12,570 
Old: over 24 years   -.0488*** 
(.0036) 2.4 1.0 12.0 0.003 
Untreated: 2,289 
Treated: 8,405 
Firm type by size       
Small: between 10 and 50 
employees 
.0305*** 
(.0015) 0.7 0.7 3.5 0.000 
Untreated: 4,078 
Treated: 57,466 
SMEs: between 50 and 250 
employees 
-.0159*** 
(.0028) 2.9 4.1 7.0 0.001 
Untreated: 3,873 
Treated: 41,273 
Firms in upper quartile of 
employment: 60 and more 
employees 
-.0351*** 
(.0023) 2.4 2.2 9.2 0.002 
Untreated: 7,638 
Treated: 50,865 
Large: 250 and more 
employees 
-.0578*** 
(.0030) 3.1 2.5 13.3 0.003 
Untreated: 4,258 
Treated: 15,476 
Notes: The outcome variable is ln(R&D personnel intensity + 1). DR results are in line with the PSM results 
in terms of sign, significance and magnitude. They are not reported here, but they are available on request. 
For other notes, see Table 5. 
 
